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In order that issues get into some
focus, this paper has been organised in
four parts. Part I, briefly outlines the
present status of the Uruguay Round.
Part II, reviews the discussions in the
15 major areas, all of which may not be
of immediate interest to India. Part III,
analyses the progress in discussions in
areas that are of interest to India.
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These are tariffs, non-tariff measures,
GATT article, safeguards, functioning
of the CATT system, MTN agreements
and arrangements, subsidies, countervailing
measures
and
dispute
settlement. Part IV, outlines some
polemical issues, viz., textil£s and
clothing, agriculture,
TRIPS and
TRIMS and services.

PART I

The Transition from GAIT
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference
established the Charters of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. No comparable institution for
trade was recognised. A draft Charter
for the International Trade Organisation
in 1946, was published by the United
States. It was, however, not fruitful. The
negotiated multilateral agreement to
reduce tariffs reciprocally, together with
a draft of the general clauses of obligations relating to the tariff obligations
became the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It was
completed by October 1947 and put into
effect by the adoption of the "Protocol
of Provisional Application" which then
was applied by 23 nations. The GAITfocused multilateral trading system has
been the anchor of the post-war trade
arrangements between countries. The
global economy has undergone a

variety of alterations, shifts. The GATT
has undergone changes over the years.
The Uruguay Round is the eighth of the
GATT negotiating rounds. The preceding 7 rounds were Geneva (1947),
Annecy (1949), Torguay (1950), Geneva
(1956), Dillon (1960-61), Kennedy (196267) and Tokyo (1973-79).
The Ministerial Declaration in Punta
del Este in Uruguay, which launched
the Uruguay Round, had agreed that
the trade negotiations would be
completed within a period of four years.
This declaration
was signed
in
September 1986. The trade talks having
failed in December 1990, could not be
resumed as planned, in February 1991.
The talks have once again failed in
December 1991. However, the major
hurdle impeding progress has been
identified. This concerns agriculture.
(1992) 4 NLSJ 25

National Law School J ol1rnal

This sector accounts for only 11% of the
world trade and about 2% of the Gross
Domestic Products of OECD countries.
Evidence indicates that the trade talks

will stretch out into 1993.With this background, it is now possible to move on to
a discussion of the 15 major areas, now
re-arranged to 7, in Part II of this paper.

PART II

Major Issues
The Uruguay Round of negotiations
was launched after a week-long
meeting that was held in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986. The
traditional concern of such negotiations
has generally been a liberalisation of
trade. The Uruguay Round. went
beyond that, it talked of the rules and
disciplines of the trading system. It also
visualised discussions in new areas
like trade in services, trade-rcla ted
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and
trade-related
investment
measures
(TRIMS).

i. bring about further liberalisation
and expansion of world trade ...
including the improvement of
access to markets by the reduction
and
elimination
of
tariffs,
quantitative restrictions and other
non-tariff measures and obstacles;
ii. strengthen the role of GATT,
improve the multilateral trading
system based on the principles
and rules of the GATT and
bring about a wider coverage of
world trade under agreed, effective
and
enforceable
multilateral
disciplines.

Negotiations
on services were
explicitly separated from negotiations
on goods as it was not entirely clear that
GATT would deal with services.
Without this distinction, quite a few
developing countries might not have
been willing to take part in the trade
negotiations. A Trade Negotiations
Committee (TNC) was set up to
monitor the overall negotiations. A
group of Negotiations on Goods (GNG)
was set up to oversee the 14 areas that
fell under the purview of negotiations
on goods. For each of these 14 areas, a
negotiating group was established. The
GNG was to report to the TNC.
Similarly, a Group of Negotiations on
Services (GNS) was established. This,
too, reported to the TNC.

Amongst other objectives were a
desire to increase the responsiveness of
the GATT system to the changing
economic environment and to foster
cooperation so that the inter-relationship between trade and other economic
policies might be strengthened. References were also made to structural
adjustments, trade in high technology
products, commodities and the link
between finance and trade. These were
areas which some developing countries
had wished to include as issues in the
Uruguay Round. Although they did not
figure as areas for discussion in
the Round, they did find a mention in
the objectives.

Amongst the objectives that the
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round set out, were the following:

The principles covering the negotiations stated that negotiations would
have to be conducted in a transparent
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manner and to the mutual advantage of
all participants. The negotiations and
the implementation
of the outcome of
the negotiations
would be a single
undertaking. But agreements reached at
an early stage could be implemented on
a provisional
basis, even before the
formal conclusion of the Round. The
principles also stated that when quid IIrO
quo balanced concessions were sought
and granted, they should be within
broad areas. Unwarranted cross-sectoral
demands
were to be excluded. The
principles
of differential
and more
favourable treatment, reciprocity and
fuller
participation
of developing
countries
would
apply
to
the
negotiations. However, reciprocity did
not mean that less-developed countries
are asked to make concessions that are
inconsistent with their developmental,
financial and trade needs. The capacity
to make concessions on the part of the
less-developed
countries was expected
to improve with the progressive development of their economies.
The ground rules for the negotiations
were to be the standstill and rollback
commitments. The standstill clause was
an undertaking not to introd uce, for the
duration of the negotiations, any GA TTinconsistent trade restrictive or distorting measure. Such measures would not
be
introduced,
more
than
was
necessary, even if they were required in
the legitimate exercise of a country's
GA TT rights. The standstill clause also
had the provision that such measures
would not be used to improve
a
participating
country's
negotiating
position.
The

rollback

commitment

was

an

undertaking that all GATT-inconsistent
trade disruptive or distorting measures
would be phased out or brought into

conformay
wilrun an agreed
time
frame. This time frame should not be
later than the formal date for the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations.
For eliminating
such
measures, no GATT concessions should
be requested

from other participants.

The standstill

and rollback commit-

ments would be subject to multilateral
surveillance. The modalities for such
surveillance
the TNC.

would

be worked

out by

Fifteen areas were to be discussed in
the Uruguay Round. 14 of these areas
came under the auspices of the GNG
and pertained to trade in goods. This
constituted Part lor the first track of the
negotiations. The fifteenth and final area
pertained to trade in services and came
under the auspices of the GNS. This
constituted Part II or the second track of
the negotiations. The 14 areas under the
GNG were as follows:
i. Tariff Negotiations
would
attempt to reduce or eliminate
tariffs.
Emphasis
would
be
attached to expanding the scope of
tariff
concessions
among
all
participants.
ii. Non-tariff measures - Negotiations would try to red uce or
eliminate
non-tariff
measures,
including quantitative restrictions.
But this would be independent of
any action taken in fulfilment of a
rollback commitment.
iii. Tropical products
Trade in
tropical
prod ucts,
including
processed
and
semi-processed
forms, would have to be liberalised
and
the
Iiberalisation
should cover both tariff and nontariff measures.
27
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iv. Natural resource-based
Trade in natural

products
resource-

based products,
including
processed and semi-processed
forms,
would
have to be Iiberalised
and
the IiberaIisation
should
cover lx)th tariff and non-tariff
measures.
Particular
attention
would have to be paid to preventing tariff escalation.
v. Textiles and clothing - Negotiations in this area would try to
formulate modalities that would
permit the eventual integration of
this sector into GATT on the basis
of strengthened
disciplines.

GAIT

rules and

vi. Agriculture - The emphasis here
was on bringing more discipline
and predictability
to world agricultural trade by correcting and
preventing
restrictions
and
distortions.
Trade in agriculture
would
have to be liberaIised.
Market access would have to be
improved
by reducing
import
barriers. There must be increasing
discipline on the use of all direct
and indirect subsidies and other
measures
that, directly or indirectly, affect agricultural trade.
Such subsidies and other distortions must be phased out. The
adverse effects of sanitary and
phytosanitary
regulations
and
barriers on trade in agriculture
must also be minimised.
vii. GAIT articles - Negotiations on
existing GAIT articles and their
provisions and disciplines will be
undertaken
as requested by interested contracting parties.

safeguards if the GAIT system is
to be strengthened
and multilateral trade negotiations are to
proceed. The agreement on safeguards must be based on the
general principles of GATT. The
agreement must contain elements
on transparency, coverage, objective criteria for action, compensation and retaliation, notification,
consultation, multilateral surveillance and dispute settlement. The
safeguards
agreement
should
apply to all contracting parties.
ix. MTN agreements
and arrangements - Negotiations in this area
would seek to improve, clarify or
expand multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) agreements and arrangements
negotiated
in the
Tokyo Round.
x. Subsidies
and
countervailing
measures negotiations would review Articles VI and XVI and the
existing
MTN
subsidies
and
measures.

agreement
on
countervailing

xi. Dispute settlement Negotiations would seek to improve and
strengthen
the
rules
and
procedures of the dispute settlement process. Adequate arrangements for overseeing and monitoring of procedures for complying with adopted
recommendations would have to be evolved.
xii. Trade-related intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) - These negotiations would
include
trade in
counterfeit
goods
and would
develop a multilateral framework
of principles, rules and disciplines

dMling with international trade in
viii. Safeguards comprehensive
28

There has to be a
agreement
on

counterfeit goods. The negotiations must develop effective and
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XII.

adequate protection of intellectual
property rights. It must, however,
be ensured that measures
and
procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves
become
barriers
to legitima te
trade. Moreover, these negotiations would be independent
of
any initiatives taken in the World
Intellectual Property Organisation
or other forum.

xiii. Trade-related

investment

mea-

sures (TRIMS) - These negotiations were to examine existing
GA IT
articles
on the trade
restrictive and distorting effects of
investment measures and develop
further provisions to prevent such
adverse effect.
xiv. Functioning of the GATT system
(FOGS) - In this area, negotiations would
seek to increase
GA IT surveillance
for regular! y
monitoring
trade policies and
practices of contracting
parties.
GA IT must also try to increase its
contribution
to global economic
policy making through increased
interaction
with
other
international organisations.
Part II of the negotiations covered
onl y one area, the fifteenth area of trade
in services. The GNS would seek to
establish a multilateral
framework of
principles
and rules
for trade in
services.
This
would
require
the
elaboration of possible disciplines for
individual sectors. The overall objective
was to be one of expanding trade in
services under conditions
of transparency and progressive

they thematically fall into three distinct
groups.
First, reduce specific trade
barriers and improve market access.
Groups under this general theme are
tariffs, non-tariff
measures,
tropical
products,
natural
resource-based
. products,
textiles and clothing and
agriculture. Second, strengthen GATT
disciplines. Groups under this theme
are GATT articles, safeguards,
MTN
agreements
and arrangements,
subsidies and countervailing
measures,
dispute settlement and the functioning
of the GATT system. Within GATT
articles, particular attention has been
devoted to the balance of payments
provisions (Articles 12 and 18), customs
unions and free trade areas (Article 24),
tariff renegotiations
(Article 28) and
state
trading
(Article
17). Third,
introduce new areas including TRIPS,
TRIMS and trade in services.
Three principles embodied
articles
form
the
basis

in GATT
of
the

negotiations. These three principles are
those of reciprocity, non-diSLTimination and
transparency. Reciprocity implies that
market-opening
concessional measures
require concessions
in return. Since
reductions
in protection
rather than
absolute
levels
of protection
are
matched, this is referred to as firstdifference reciprocity. Non-discrimination is embodied in the most favourednation (MFN) clause. This means that
one member of GATT or a group of
members of GA IT must not be given preferential trade treatment over the others.
Every GAIT member has to be treated
as favourably as the most favoured.
Transparency requires the replacement
of non-tariff barriers by tariffs, followed
by a binding of those tariffs.

Iiberalisation.

Although the 15 different negotiating
mandates were listed out separately,

Consider in the following part of this
paper, some issues affecting
India,
which is a developing country case.
29
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PART III

Some Issues Affecting India
Considers nine issues that affect India,
a developing country. These areas are
tariffs, non-tariff measures, GAIT
articles, safeguards, the functioning of
the GAIT system, MTN agreements
and arrangements,
subsidies and
countervailing measures, and dispute
settlement.

Tariffs
A mid-term review of the Uruguay
Round of negotiations was held in
Montreal in December 1988. Till the
mid-term review, negotiations in the
group on tariffs were bogged down
by the basic point of how tariff cuts
were to be achieved. Most countries
suggested a formula by which tariffs
could be cut. It was then agreed that
countries would cut their overall tradcweighted tariffs by about one-third. The
scope of tariff bindings would also be
increased.
Throughout 1989, the issue of how
countries would achieve the Montreal
liberalisation target of one-third tariff
reductions was not satisfactorily resolved. But some sort of an agreement
was reached in 1990. It was decided that
countries would submit proposals by
March 15, 1990, indicating how the
Montreal target was to be achieved. No
single method was prescribed for
achieving these results. The U.S.
proposal was on a request/offer basis
and integrated tariffs and non-tariff
measures. Most developed countries
submitted proposals for cuts according
to formulds which llpplied to the Vllst
majority of ind ustrial tariffs. Developing countries submitted a hetero30

geneous bag of proposals. In some
cases, there were substantive formula
cuts and increases in bindings. In other
cases, the proposed cuts did not amount
to much. The reason was that all
countries did not necessarily have to
submit proposals of a reduction by one
third. Some flexibility was given to
developing countries to make offers
which were less extensive.
India made a conditional offer of
redudng the basic duty by 30%. This
offer was only for items on which duties
were above 25% ad valorem. The duty
reduction is to be made over a period of
6 years and covers raw materials,
intermediates and capital goods, but
excludes
agricultural
products,
petroleum products, fertilisers and
some non-ferrous metals like copper,
zinc, aluminium, lead and magnesium.
Consumer durables were excluded
from the offer and auxiliary duties and
countervailing duties were not to be
affected. But this offer is subject to the
entire Uruguay Round package being
acceptable to India at the end of the
negotiations. For instance, there must be
a reduction of tariffs in products that are
of export interest to India. And textiles
and clothing must be satisfactorily
integrated within GATT.
Once all these proposals came in, the
negotiating group on tariffs had several
meetings in April and May 1990 to
review and evaluate the various
proposals. In June and July 1990, the
focus shifted from multilateral to
bilateral discussions. The objective was
to improve on the initial proposals and
to improve on the initial proposals and
secure reciprocal concessions. Since
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there were ofl:en linkages across the
offers made in various areas, from
October 1990, the negotiating groups on
tariffs, non-tariff measures, natural
resource-based products and tropical
products held joint meetings. Since
quite a few countries linked the offer
made in tariffs with the progress
achieved in agriculture, the negotiations
on tariffs, particularly industrial tariffs,
made very little further progress.- After
the _reorganisation, negotiations on
tariffs form part of the market access
negotiations. The major area for negotiations now is the period of implementation of the tariff concessions.

Non-Tariff Measures
Most of the early rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations concentrated on tariffs. By the time of the
Tokyo Round in 1973, it was however
recognised that there were other forms
of barriers to trade. These also distort
trade and are known as non-tariff
measures. While it may be difficult to
precisely define a non-tariff measure,
examples are not hard to find. Examples
are import quotas or other quantitative
restrictions,
non-automatic
import
licensing, customs charges or other fees
and charges, customs procedures, export subsidies, unreasonable standards
or standard-setting procedures, government procurement restrictions, and
even inadequate intellectual property
protection and investment restrictions.
Some of these issues were discussed in
the Tokyo Round and seven codes were
negotiated. These were on customs
valuation, import licensing, subsidies
and
countervailing
duties,
antidumping duties, standards, government
procurement, and trade in civilian
aircraft. The codes are open for signature

to all GAIT members. But the mere
existence of the codes did not prevent
the proliferation of non-tariff measures.
In the Uruguay Round, a specific
negotiating group had been set up to
look into specific non-tariff measures.
Negotiations on non-tariff measures
have largely proceeded on a request/
offer basis. Request lists are submitted
by a member country and offers emerge
as a response. The idea is to negotiate the
modification or elimination of non-tariff
measures that figure on such request
lists. Much of the liberalisation on nontariff measures has however come about
as a result of developing countries unilaterally dismantling such barriers. The
most obvious example is import licensing requirements. In some cases, the
elimination of non-tariff measures has
been linked to obtaining market access
concessions from trading partners.
After the reorganisation, non-tariff
measures have been incorporated in the
market access group. A draft market
access protocol has been prepared. This
states that the same GAIT provisions
which govern tariff bindings will apply
to NTM bindings also. One of the areas
of negotiation now is the application of
Article 28 in cases of modification or
withdrawal of non-tariff concessions.
In the negotiations on non-tariff
measures, two additional areas that
deserve special attention emerged. The
first of these was on pre-shipment
inspection and the second was on rules
of origin.
Many developing countries hire preshipment inspection firms to inspect
goods for export in the country of
origin. The intention is to check
the quantity and quality of the exports
and to verify lhe price charged. The
31
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argument advanced against such preshipment inspection is that these
inspections interfere with exports by
causing delays. They compromise
confidential business information and
compel exporting firms to lower prices.
Since exporters in developed countries
suffer from these effects, it was
proposed that the negotiating group on
non-tariff measures should work out an
agreement on pre-shipment inspection.
This agreement would regulate the
activities of pre-shipment inspection
(PSI) firms by setting deadlines for
pre-shipment
inspections, imposing
notification requirements
for PSI
procedures,
protecting
confidential
business information, establishing price
verification guidelines and providing
for fast dispute resolution between
exporters and PSI firms.
The basic ingredients for such
an agreement are already in place.
Transparency, delays and protection of
confidential business information have
not led to any controversy. But there has
been some disagreement over price
verification and dispute resolution. The
draft text of the agreement, which is
yet-to be approved by TNC, does
stipulate that price verification should
not be used to lower a contract price.
The text also provides a mechanism for
dispute settlement between exporters
and PSI firms. This is to be administered
jointly by the International Federation
of Inspection Agencies (IFIA) and the
International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC). PSI is now part of the rulemaking grou p.
Rules of origin identify the country in
which a product originates. These are
used for granting MFN treatment,
setting tariffs for preferential

trade a.nd

for imposing quantitative restrictions or
anti-dumping or countervailing duties.
32
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Per se, rules of origin do not constitute
non-tariff measures. But they can distort
trade if they are strictly enforced. They
can also reinforce other restrictive trade
practices. The negotiations seek to
ensure that rules of origin procedures
are transparent. But there have been
major disagreements between the
U.S.A. and the European Community. It
is not disputed that there should be a
harmonisation of rules of origin
procedures.
But
the
European
Community prefers a discussion of
harmonisations
in
the
Customs
Cooperation Council, the U.S.A. would
prefer to have an agreement through
GAIT. The European Community
wishes to exclude preferential rules
from the scope of the agreement, the
U.S.A. would like to include these as
well. The European Community has
been insisting on one origin rule for all
non-preferential purposes, the U.S.A.
prefers to be more flexible.
By December 1990, a tentative
consensus was reached and the text of a
rules of origin agreement was drafted,
though not approved by the TNC. The
text contains principles and disciplines
that will apply to all non-preferential
rules of origin. New origin rules or
changes to existing rules must be
published atleast 60 days before they
take effect. A GATT Committee and a
Customs Cooperation Council (CCC)
Technical Committee on rules of origin
is to be constituted. The text also
specifies notification, review, consultation and dispute settlement provisions.
A harmonisation work plan is to be
worked out by GAIT and the CCC
within three years after the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round. This will form a
binding a.nnex to the GATT ilgreement
containing common rules of origin for
all non-preferential purposes. Specific

The 01\ '}"]' and the Urllgllay ROllnd
disci plines on preferential
rules of
origin are also included in the text. As
with PSI, after the reorganisation, rules
of origin have been incorporated in the
rule making group.

GATT Articles
The mandate of the negotiating group
on GATT articles was fairly general.
Any issue which is not covered in any
of the other negotiating groups can, in
principle, be discussed in this group.
One of the articles discussed was
Article IHB and the related
1979
Declaration on Trade Measures taken
for
BOP
(balance
of
payments)
purposes. Under Article 18B, countries
that
are experiencing
balance
of
payments problems can impose import
restrictions
like quotas or licensing
restrictions.
Developed
countries
argued that Article IHB was resorted to
indiscriminately
and concessions made
by developing countries in other areas
could
be nega ted by using such
restrictions.
The proposal
was that
criteria for assessing trade restrictions
applied for BOP purposes should be set
out, guidelines
should
be set out
limiting the actions that such countries
could
take
and
disciplines
and
procedures prescribed for countries that
adopted measures in excess of these
guidelines. The proposal was opposed
by developing
countries
like India,
Brazil, Egypt,
Peru, Pakistan
and
Philippines. The Indian position was
that India did not want the legal basis of
the import licensing
regime to be
changed in any way. The negotiating
group was therefore not able to reach
any agreement on whether Article IHB
could be negotiated at all. There was
no consensus
at all in Brussels in
December 1990.

Article 17 relating to state trading
was also discussed and this proved to
be far less controversial. A draft agreement was arrived at. This clarified
disciplines attaching to and increased
transparency
over state trading enterprises. The text made it clear that state
trading enterprises (STEs) would not
only have to operate in accordance with
the provisions of Article 17, but would
have to follow the other articles as well.
A STE would not be allowed to engage
in discriminatory distribution practices
(Article 3), export items at preferential
prices (Articles 6 and 16) or impose
quotas (Article 11). Once adopted, this
agreement
will reduce
the trade
restrictive practices of STE<;. The draft
agreement
has been accepted by all
countries. India has however stated that
Indian
support
is subject
to reevaluation
after the entire Uruguay
Round package is complete.
Discussions

were also held on Article

24. This relates to preferential trading
areas, that is, free trade areas and
customs unions. This was of some
concern to developing
countries
as
multilateralism
was threatened by the
emergence of regional trading blocs.
The position on this article is, however,
not a t all c1ear.
There arc draft

texts on Article 25

(GATT waivers) and the Protocol of
Provisional Application (PP A). The text
on waivers imposes increased disciplines on waivers
to the General
Agreement. The PP A text imposes time
limits on the use of the grandfather
cia use, tha t is, the cia use tha tallows
countries
to
maintain
mandatory
legislation
in place at the time of
accession to GATT. A draft text on
Article
35, relating
to the nonapplication
of GATT to acceding
33
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countries, has also been accepted by the
participants, subject to some reservations about the legal and technical
implications of the text. Obviously,
decisions on all these texts will be taken
in the light of results in other areas of
negotiations. After the reorganisation,
GAll" articles are being discussed by
the group on rule-making.

Safeguards
One of the shortcomings of GATT has
been is inability to prevent major
imposing
countries
from forcing
exporting countries to undertake export
restraints in individual products. This
affects the interests of developing
countries, as they are an easy target for
accepting such restraint arrangements,
often arrived at bilaterally and labelled
as
voluntary
export
restraints.
Countries like Australia, New Zealand,
Austria, Brazil, Argentina,
India,
Pakistan, Hong Kong and Singapore
have urged for a comprehensive
safeguard agreement which ensures
that a safeguard measure is only taken
on an nondiscriminatory basis. That
is, the safeguard action should be
MFN-based.
Safeguards were also discussed in the
Tokyo Round, but there was no success.
And there were problems in the
Uruguay Round as well. A country
which faces a surge in imports might
wish to apply temporary trade restrictions selectively to other countries. The
question is whether such restrictions
would have to be applied globally, on a
MFN basis. Article 19 seems to suggest
that they should. But Article 19 also has
the provision tha t an affected exporting
country can seek compensation on
restrictions on its products. And if such
compensation is not forthcoming, the
34

affected country is free to retaliate.
Given this spectre of retaliation,
countries facing a temporary increase in
imports are loathe to resort to Article 19.
And the problem is circumvented by
negotiating bilateral export restraints.
While the legal provisions of GATT may
not be violated in the process, the spirit
of GATT is undoubtedly violated. And
the catch is that an affected third country
cannot raise the issue in GATT dispute
settlements.
The European Community initially
argued that there must be some scope
for selectivity in imposing temporary
trade restrictions. The developing
countries, and some developed countries, however pointed out that
selectivity was liable to abuse. Negotiations could proceed once the European
Community abandoned its position on
selectivity. But an element of "quota
modulation" is permitted. This means
that quantitative restrictions have to be
imposed on a MFN basis. But the
importing country is permitted to hit
some countries harder than others in
allocating quota shares. Some compromises were also reached on the
duration of safeguard measures and the
definition of critical circumstances and
there was a detailed text on safeguards
by December 1990. Safeguards negotiations now form part of the group on
rule-making.

The Functioning of the GATT
System
The negotiating group on the functioning of the GATT system (FOGS)
covered a wide variety of issues. A
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(TPRM) hus been formed,' In this forum,
countries make presentations on their
economic and trade policies. It has also
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been agreed that trade ministers of
individual countries will meet atleast
once every two years to discuss the
performance
of the world
trading
system.
At a more fundamental
level, this
group has attempted to question and
change the na ture 01 GA IT itself,
against the backdrop of the changing
world economic environment. GATT is
to be transformed into a World Trading
Organisation (WTO). Naturally enough,
this cannot be done in the course of the
Uruguay Round. All that is sought is a
ministerial declaration to that effect in
the course
of the Round.
This
framework will provide the guidelines
for post - Uruguay Round negotiations
on such an institution. The proposal for
the WTO emana ted from the European
Community and Canada and received
considerable
support
from
the
developed countries, with the exception
of the U.s.A. As an organisation,
the
WTO will provide a common roof for
GA IT, a general agreement on trade in
services, a world intellectual property
organisation
and
possible
other
agreements on intellectual property and
investments.
The secretariat
will be
upgraded
into an organisation
with
independent
functions and there wi}!
be a common
dispute
settlement
machinery.
The Indian position has been that
WTO can be discussed and considered
only after the Uruguay Round is over.
Moreover, such an organisation would
also have to consider
issues like
restrictive
business
practices,
commodities
and access to technology.
These are issues that are of vital concern
to developing

countries.

The negotiating group on FOGS has
also proposed
that there be greater

coordination between GATT, the IMP
and the World Bank. At a general level,
it is not quite clear how this is to be
implemented.
There is a proposal that
the world's trade and finance ministers
make
a joint declaration
on the
principles of coherence and define in
broad terms how trade, financial and
monetary policies interact. At a more
functional level, there are proposals on
formalised
staff, management
and
policy linkages
between
the three
institutions. The negotiating group on
FOGs has more or less agreed on a
strengthened
ins titu tional structure for
GATT, centralisation of GAIT notifications, establishment
of a GATI-wide
surveillance
system
and
regular
ministerial
meetings
under
GAIT
auspices. Negotiations on the WTO, the
establishment
of a GATT managerial
board and joint efforts on the part of
GATT, the IMF and the World Bank to
achieve greater global coherence in
policy-making
have not made much
progress. That is natural .as these are
really post-Uruguay Round issues and
can only be sorted out subsequently.
There are two draft tests, as of now.
The first is on the Institutional
Reinforcement
of the GATT and the
second on Grea ter Coherence in Global
Economic Policy Making. After the
reorganisation, the FOGs group is part
of the group on dispute settlement and
final act.

MTN Agreements and
Arrangements
When the Tokyo Round ended in
1979, six major agreements on non-tariff
measures emerged. These are referred
to as codes and relate to anti-dumping,
government
procurement,
customs
valuation, import licensing procedures,
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technical barriers to trade (standards)
and
subsidies
and
countervailing
measures. The negotiating
group on
MTN agreements
and arrangements
was to review and revise, if necessary,
the first five of these codes. Subsidies

to expilnd the code's covemge to telecommunications,
energy and services
contrilcts.

and
countervailing
measures
constituted a separate negotiating group.

amend the existing code, but provides
for a decision by the Committee on
Customs Valuation. The text clarifies

The anti-dumping
code was an area
where there was no agreement at all.
The U.s.A. and the European
Community did not desire any substantial
change
in the existing
rules, they
wished to update the code so that
the circumvention
of anti-dumping
measures
could
be
prevented.
Countries like Singapore, Korea, Hong
Kong, lndia, Japan and the Nordic
countries
pressed
for a substantial
revision of the anti-dumping
code.
Despite intensive negotiations on issues
like the methods of calculating costs of
prod uction,
averagi ng
of
prices,
standards
for injury determination,
standards
to initiate
investigations,
phasing out of anti dumping duties and
measures to address the circumvention
of anti-dumping
duty orders, there was
no agreement at all and there was not
even a draft text by December 1<)1}0.
When government procurement was
discussed
in this negotiating
group,
contracting parties agreed on a text that
clarified, but did not change, current
code accession procedures for countries
interested
in joining the code. The
expansion of the coverage to central
government
enti tics,
sub-centrill
government entities ilnd quasi-government .enti ties was illso discussed. Bu t
some
negotiil tions
on
procurement
were held

government
outside the

group. The Covernment
Code signiltories
met
outside of the negotiating

Procurement
in Brussels,
group, to try
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Informill consultiltions
on customs
valuation resulted in a text that docs not

the authority of customs officials to
ilddress fmud resulting from undervilluiltion or over-valuation.
Details
like burden of proof, officially established minimum values and importiltions by sole concessionaires were also
sorted out.
A draft
ilgreement
on
import
licensing \,VilS prepilred and ilccepted
prior to December 11}()(). This was based
on a proposill put forwilrd jointly by the
U.s.A. and Hong Kong. The draft
improves
the procedures
and disciplines of the existing code, especially on
non-ilutomiltic imporllicences. The new
text strengthens the Import Licensing
Code both procedumlly
and substantively.
It adds
new stringent
notification provisions. India submitted
a proposal
thilt export
licensing
procedures should also be covered. This
WilS not included in the text. India,
therefore, made its ilcceptance of the
text conditional on whether countries
supported
the Indiiln proposal
of
forming il CATT working party after
the Uruguay Round to consider CA TT
disciplines on export licensing.
111.,<;0 fa I' as standilrds

arc concerned,

a

drilfting group consisting of key interested countries prepared il common
negotiilting text ilfter incorpomting all
the individual proposals that hild been
received. The drafting group consisted
of the United States, the European
Community,
jilpan, Canada, Mexico,
the Nordic countries,
Hong Kong,

The GATT and the Uruguay Round
New Zealand,
India, Australia
and
Brazil. Most of the issues were agreed
upon prior to the Brussels meeting in
December 1990. The four issues which
were to be thrashed out by the ministers
in Brussels were appropriate
dispute
settlement procedures, the relationship
of the agreement to any new agreement
on health and safety measures, obligations for central governments
with
respect to local government oodies and
the form that the agreement should
take. Broad
agreement
had been
reached on the first two issues when the
Uruguay

Round wound

up.

AU negotiations on MTN agreements
and arrangements
now constitute part
of the rule making group.

Subsidies and Counterva iling
Measures
The

Punta

del

Este

Ministerial

declaration stated that the group on
subsidies and countervailing
measures
should review Articles 6 and 16 and the
MTN Agreement
on Subsides
and
Countervailing
Measures (Codes) with
the objective
of improving
GATT
disciplines relating to all subsidies and
countervailing
measures
that affect
international trade.
At present,
GAIT
rules prohibit
export subsidies on industrial products.
There are weak levels of obligations on
export subsidies
on primary
agricui tu ra I prod ucts a nd virtu a IIy no
effective
discipline
on
domestic
subsidies. Devvloping
countries have
been given the flexibility to use export
subsidies even for industrial products.
But developing
countries
can be
subjected to countervailing
duties in
instances
where
subsidised
exports
cause material injury to the domestic
industry
in the importing
country.

Developing countries like India have
argued
that
developing
country
practices
are
mainly
directed
at
correcting market imperfections
and
distortions.
They are therefore trade
neutral and the flexibility granted to
developing countries should continue
in the new agreement.
At the mid-tenn

review in December

1988, participants agreed to adopt the
"traffic light" approach
for further
negotiations.
Subsidies
would
be
classified into three categories
prohibited
"red light" subsidies,
permissible but actionable "yellow light"
subsidies
and permissible
and nonactionable
"green
light"
subsidies.
Participants
were to submit specific
negotiating proposals on the basis of
this traffic light catcgorisation.
The
U.s.A. has been forcefully arguing for
an inclusion of export subsidies
on
primary
agricultural
products
and
domestic subsidies
in the red light
category. Most developing
countries
would like to expand, not restrict,
developing
country access to special
and differential treatment in the matter
of subsidies. There is also the related
issue of commitments
to phase
subsidies over a fixed time frame.

out

Negotiations
remained
divided on
how to achieve effective new subsidies
disciplines,
how to identify specific
domestic subsidies as permissible, how
to improve the international subsidies
dispute settlement mechanism and how
to extend disciplines
more fully to
developing
countries.
Developing
countries were particularly concerned
about the question of minimising the
possibility
of trade harassment
in
countervailing duty proceedings. After
the
reorganisation,
subsidies
and
countervailing
measures form part of
the rule-making group.
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Dispute Settlement
One of GATT's

tasks is to resolve

disputes among member countries and
this has often run into problems of
credibility.
Countries
exploit opportunities for delay in the system and
disputes often take years to resolve. It
was clear that the rules and procedures
of the dispute settlement process needed
to be streamlined and strengthened. The
mid-term review agreed on procedural
improvements to the dispute settlement
system and these were implemented on
a trial basis in May 1989. This removed
opportunities
for delay and set deadlines for the completion of the dispute
settlement process.
Two problems remain unsolved. The
first is that of ensuring that a panel's
ruling is adopted
by the member
nations, particularly the ones that lose
the dispute.
The second is that of
ensuring
that
the losing
country
removes it GAIT - inconsistent trade
practices within a reasonable period
of time. Also unresolved is the question
of whether
different
dispute
settlement procedures should be applied to
"non-violation"
disputes.
These are

disputes which involve the nullification
and impairment of GATT benefits, but
do not violate GATT. Countries have
also raised the question of unilateral
action, especially U.S. action under
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act,
amended in 1988. The point is that, if
the dispute
settlement
system
is
improved, there must be a commitment
to use the GATT dispute settlement
system for all trade disputes rather than
resort to unilateral action.
Dispute settlement is now part of the
group on dispute settlement and final
act. The expression final act has not so
far been used. This involves the issues
of whether the instruments
resulting
from the Uruguay Round should or
should not be accepted as a single
undertaking
and the form of the
decision to be taken in respect of a new
organisational
structure to be impIcmented after the conclusion of the
Round. A Draft Final Act was prepared
in December 1990. But this can naturally
be considered only after negotiations in
other areas are over.
We now move on to five polemical
issues in the Uruguay Round.

PART IV

Some Polemical Issues
The more polemical issues in the
Uruguay
Round
are textiles
and
clothing, agriculture, TRIPs, TRIMs and
services.

Textiles and Clothing
It w~s ~grced ut Puntu del Este thut
that there would be an attempt to
re-integrate
textiles into GATT. For
38

three decades, trade in textiles and
clothing has been governed by special
arrangements. These are authorised by
GATT, but are more restrictive thun
normal GAIT rules. Textile exports are
managed by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), in effect since 1974.
Developing countries which are large
exporters of textiles face quotas imposed
under
the MFA and
developing

The GA 1vr and the Uruguay Ronnd
have linked ~he ph~sing ou~ of the MFA
to progress made in other negotiating
groups and to the reform of trade
regimes in the developing countries.
The
several

1974 MFA brought
together
earlier deals under a common

framework.
If offered
temporary
protection,
because
of the bilateral
quotas,
to producers
in developed
countries. Some estimates show that
imports of developed countries would
increase by 50 billion US dollars a year
if free trade in textiles and clothing
could be instituted.
Consumers
in
developed
countries
would
gain
through lower prices. And producers in
developed
countries
would
not
necessarily lose as much as they would
have 20 years ago, as they have moved
their production to other sectors. There
is, thus, not much of an opposition to
the phasing
out of the MFA. The
question is how, and when.
The present MFA expires in 1992.
There is an American proposal
for
phasing out the MFA over a ten-year
period, beginning 1992. In the period of
transition, the bilateral quotas will be
replaced by global quotas for each
product. The global quota will initially
consist of the existing bilateral quotas
plus a non-selective "global basket".
The global basket will have a prescribed
annual growth rate. For example, there
will be il minimum growth rate for the
first 3 years, the minimum plus one
percent for the next 3 years, the
minimum plus 2 percent for the next 2
years and the minimum plus 3 percent
for the final 2 years. The existing quotas
will slowly be reallocilted to the basket
so tha t, a t the end of 10 yea rs, there wi II
be single and enlarged quota for each
product. Importers Ciln freely allocate
the quotas to producers of their choice

and the global quotas
abolished.
A global
efficient than a set of
But there is opposition
proposal
because
it
restrictions to countries

are eventually
quota is more
bilateral quotas.
to the American
extends
quota
that are not at

present covered by the quota regime.
Unless the global quotas are expanded
fast, the system has the potential to
become more protectionist
than the
present MFA.
The
developing
countries
hilve
suggested a faster liberalisation path.
The existing MFA quotas are to be
expanded quickly, within a period of 5
years, so tha t they no longer restrict
trade.
The U.s. proposal,
and another
proposal submitted by Canada, was on
the basis of quotas determined
on a
most favoured
nation system.
The
European Community and some textile
exporting countries preferred il selective
system based on the present quotas. The
dmft agreement, for example, suggests
il grildual integration of textiles into the
GATT frame work. During a transition
period of 15 years, only 45% of products
become integrated into GAIT. Nothing
is mentioned about the remaining 55%.
Moreover, the demand is that natural
fibres, not governed by MFA quotas as
of now, would also be included in the
product coverage during the period of
transition.
Obviously,
developing
countries like India have not reacted
favourably

to such a proposal.

What may eventually emerge is a
compromise.
There could be global
quota which grows fairly slowly. But
imports above the global quota would
not be banned, they would only be
subject to higher tariffs. The transitional
textile regime, incorporating the length
of the transition period, quota growth
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removal
of products
from
coverage
and transitional
safeguard
measures, still remains to be thrashed
out. An agreement
would probably
have been reached had there not been
an impasse in the talk<; on agriculture.
Meanwhile, the MFA was extended
by the Textiles Committee of GATT for
a fourth time. This extension
was
decided on in August 1991 and the
extension is for a period of seventeen
months till the end of December 1992.
Developing
countries
were
more
interested in the dismantling
of the
MFA. Therefore, countries like India
and pakistan have opposed this fourth
extension,
although
there was no
attempt to block the extension. The
point is that, when the MFA was first
introd uced in EJ74, the quotas did not
affect India much, as quota utilisalions
were low. But quota utilisations went
up dramatically in the second half of the
19KOs and firms were oflen unsure
about the availability of quotas. It is of
course by no means obvious that India
would necessarily gain if textiles were
to be liberalised
through
the dismantling of the MFA. The competition
from Hungi1ry, Yugoslavii1, Poland,
Germany, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan
and China is likely to be quite severe.

Agriculture
Historically, GATT has ignored trade
distorting
agricultural
policies. The
heavy subsidisiltion of production ilnd
exports of basic agricultural foodstuffs
by the major industrialised
countries
have not so far, been considered by
GATT. There ilre several estimates to
show the substantial

gains that can be

by libet'<llit;ing agt'icuHul'al
trMil'.
Accordingly, the negotiating group on
ap'iculture has discussed the distortions
made
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and

countries

like

the

USA

and

Australia have come to regard success
in agriculture as crucial to the overall
success of the Uruguay Round.
An original
American
proposat
tabled in 1987, sought the elimination of
all trade distorting agricultural policies
over a ten-year period. The European
Community,
which was the prime
offender,
was
not
prepared
to
countenance reforms that affected the
basic structure of the Common AgricuHura I Policy (CAP). Through CAP,
internal
prices
in the
European
Community
are
supported,
even
though they are far ilbove world prices.
Agricultural talks reached a stalemate
at the time of the mid-tenn review in
Decernber ]lJKK. The Cairns Group is a
group of agricultural product exporting
countril's, both developed and developing. The Cairns Group consists of
Australia,
Canada,
New
Zealand,
Malaysia,
Indonesia,
Philippines,
Thailand"
Argentina,
Brazil, Chile,
Colombiil, Uruguay and Hungary. At
the time of the midterm review, the
Cairns Group tried to work out a
proposal that would be a compromise
between
the US and E.C. points
of view.
By !lJKlJ, it vvas agreed that there
would be substantial and progressive
reductions in support and protection. It
was also agrl'ed that GATT rules and
disciplines would be strengthened and
that market access, internal support and
export competition would be discussed.
Another issue was whether liberalisation commitments
would be required
from developing countries. This was
pa rticula r1y true of domestic agricultural
policies. After a II, government measures
011

at;t;it;hlnCl' to l'nCoul'age

and rural development
integral
part of the

agt'icultural

formed an
development
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developing

In December 1990, in Brussels, the

countries. Accordingly, it was agreed
that special and differential treatment
for developing countries would form an
integral part of the negotiations. But the
scope and extent of this special dispensation had to be worked out. It was also

Chairman of the Negotiating Group on
Agriculture
tried to bridge the gap
between the us. and the E.C. positions
through the submission of a draft text.
This text, known as the Hellstrom text,
proposed
30 percent reductions
on
internal
support,
border
protection
(import levies) and export subsidies.
This text was far short of what the proponents of liberalisation had asked for.
But when the European Community
refused to accept even the Hellstrom
text, negotiations
on agriculture,
the
entire Uruguay Round, broke down.

programmes

of

many

agreed that health and sanitary conditions would be harmonsied
and that
non-trade concerns, like food security,
should be taken into consideration.
When long-term reform proposals
were submitted
in December
1989,
there was again a stalemate. The U.S.
proposal called for tariffication, that is,
the conversion
of all market access
barriers to tariffs. These tariffs would
then be red uced to zero or low levels
over a period of 10 years. Most tradedistorting
internal price and income
support measures would have to be
phased out over this period. Less tradedistorting measures
would be disciplined or permitted
to stay. Export
subsidies would have to be phased out
over a period of 5 years.
The European Community
was not
prepared
to accept this proposal. A
counter-offer was made on the basis of
an aggregate
measure
of support
(AMS). Different forms of protection
would
be captured
into a single
measure and targets for reducing this
single measure would be agreed upon.
It would be upto individual countries to
decide which specific measures should
be cut and by how much. The AMS was
to apply to groups of commodities like
wheat or corn. The AMS offer was
clearly not acceptable as it allowed
support reductions in one category to
be offset by increases
in another
and this could have implications
for
trading partners. The European Community also rejected the principle of
tariffica tion.

Despite the resumption
of talks in
February 1991, there are absolutely no
signs that the European Community is
prepared to compromise. The future of
talks on agriculture, and the future of
the Uruguay Round, remains beset with
hurdles.

Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights
Negotiations
on trade-related
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) began in
March 1987. Developed countries, by
and large, have supported
a comprehensive
package on TRIPs. This
package would be under GAIT and
would encompass substantive
standards of protection
for all areas of
intellectual
property
(patents, trademarks, copyrights),
effective enforcement measures (both at the border and
internally) and effective dispute settlement provisions. In addition to a draft
legal text submitted by the US.A., draft
legala texts have also been submitted by
the European Community, Switzerland
and Japan. There is some polarisation of
view
points
amongst
developed
countries,
particularly
on copyright
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standards. Most developed countries
desire a straight-forward application of
GAIT to the standards for copyright
protection set out in the Berne
Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works.
The polarisation of views between
developed and developing countries in
sharper. The popular impression of
TRIPs is that it is all a matter of piracy
and counterfeiting. But there is more to
TRIPs than that. Developing countries
are genuinely concerned about patent
protection for technologically sophisticated goods like drugs and chemical
fertilisers. Developing countries have
major technological development and
public interest objectives to consider.
India would like to retain the flexibility
for excluding vital areas like pharmaceuticals, chemicals and food technology from products patents. The
patent system is important for promoting industrial development, as is the
mechanism of compulsory licensing.
A group of fourteen developing
countries, including India, Brazil, Egypt,
Uruguay and Argentina therefore
submitted an alternative legal text. The
idea here is that GATT involvement
should be limited to border measures to
address copyright piracy and trademark
counterfeiting.
There
would
be
flexibility for national laws on TRIPs in
accordance
with
developmental
objectives. Apart from piracy and
counterfeiting, guidelines in other areas
like substantive standards, should be
administered outside GATT, possibly
through the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO).
TRIPS will now be discussed in the
TRIMs and TRIPs group. While there is
considerable disagreement on TRIPs,
the divergences seem to be much less
42

than was the case four years ago. There
will probably not be a broad and single
comprehensive deal, to be lodged in
GATT and subject to normal dispute
settlement procedures. What is more
likely is a loose bundle of smaller
agreements. There would be tough
rules on piracy and counterfeiting. But
that apart, governments would retain a
fair degree of flexibility.

Trade Related Investment
Measures
In the negotiating group on traderelated investment measures (TRIMs),
there have been differences among
developed and developing countries
about whether investment measures
like export obligations and local
manufacturing requirements should be
disciplined and even prohibited, or
whether it is enough'to address their
trade-distortive effects. Twelve different
measures were intensively discussed in
the TRIMs group. The major ones were
local content requirements, export
commitments and' foreign exchange
earnings.
Developed
countries,
with the
exception of Australia, desired a
prohibition of specific TRIMs and most
developing countries opposed any such
prohibition.
Developing
countries
proposed
disciplines
limited
to
remedying the trade-distorting effects
of TRIMs, as and when demonstrated.
Local content requirements violate the
national treatment provisions of GATT
and are therefore difficult to defend. But
developing countries have argued that
export commitments do not necessarily
restrict trade. In any case, the existing
provisions of GATT on anti-dumping
are adequate to address the tradedistorting effects of such measures.

The GATT curd the Uruguay Round
Progress in TRIMs negotia tions has
been slow, but this does not necessarily imply that an agreement is out
of reach. For example, there could be a
prohibition
of local content requirements and a disciplining of other
TRIMs.

Services
When services were first included in
the Uruguay Round, reservations
were
expressed
by
developing
countries like Brazil and India. The
fear was that developing countries
would be swamped by banking and
insurance firms from the developed
countries.
Conversely,
developing
countries would not be able to exploit
the services sectors where they
possessed a comparative advantage,
as cross-border movements of labour
would not be permitted.
Despite the initial reservations, the
outlines of a multilateral agreement
have become clearer. Principles like
transparency, MFN treatment, safeguards and progressive liberalisation
will apply across the board to all
service sectors. (There is still some
controversy on how MFN treatment is
to be applied to services). Specific
commitments will be reflected in
separate schedules for each country.
These commitments will also indicate
the mode of delivery (cross border
delivery, movement of consumers,
commercial presence and movement
of personnel).
One of the problems is the question
of the coverage of the framework
agreement. The U.S.A. and Japan have
proposed that the agreement must
allow countries to exclude one or more
sectors from the coverage of the

agreement. The U.S.A. would, for
instance, like to exclude shipping,
banking and aviation. The European
Community prefers universal coverage. The developed countries prefer a
negative list approach. This means that
market access would be deemed to be
given except in the case of sectors or
sub-sector that are mentioned in the
negative list. Developing countries
prefer a positive list approach. This
means
tha t no market
access
commitment can be presumed unless a
sector or sub-sector is mentioned in the
list. Initially, there was the question of
special treatment
for developing
countries. The consensus now seems to
be that no special treatment will be
given except in terms of a longer
phasing period for liberalisation.
The main problem is that, till
December 1990 there were no concrete
market
access commitments
for
services. It is this which now has to be
worked out, especially since the U.s.A.
has linked the MFN clause to market
access commitments.
After talks
resumed in February 1991, discussions
have concentrated on the frame work,
the initial commitments and sectoral
annexes. The major irritant now seems
to be the American reluctance to open
up the shipping and banking sectors.
The Indian position is that some
areas of the services sector could be
opened up in return for access to
overseas markets on a l-eciprocal basis.
India does not have much to g-ain in
sectors like banking, telecommunications, air transportation, shipping and
construction.
India's
comparative
advantage
is in labour intensive
sectors. But access to overseas markets
in these areas is related to the freedom
for movement of personnel. This is
what the negotiations will be over. The
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major sectors where India would seek a
liberalisation and opening up are
professional services, computer maintenance, data processing, - technical
testing and analysis, health-related
services, hospitals and tourism.

Conclusion
Prof.
Jagdish
Bhagwati
has
recommended a multitiered flexible
approach to the final deal. Following is
a reproduction.

A Multitiered Flexible Approach to the Final Deal
Tier I: On Goods

GIVE
RECEIVE

Developing
Countries

Developing
Countries
Developed
Countries

Developed
Countries
1. Safeguards
2. MFA
3. Agriculture

Balance-of-payments
discipline and give
effective market access by
moderating or deleting
Article XVIII(b)

Tier II: On Services

GIVE
RECEIVE
Developing
Countries

Developing
Countries
Developed
Countries

1. Quantity obligations
during this period
2. Conditional MFN at end
of period

Developed
Countries
Time-bound,
unconditional MFN

Tier III: On TRIPs

The new compact extends rights and obligations only to those who join it. The
compact is under GATT, but GATT sanctions apply only to those who join
the compact. All OECD and several developing countries can be expected to join at
the outset.
Tier IV: On TRIMs

Approach similar to that with TRIPs.
Note: The time period and the extent of obligations would differ by country and by sector,
under services.
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